The Tripod isn’t Balanced February 1, 2008
Posted by Conrad Hubbard in : The Chip , add a commentMy last two blog posts have both supported the idea of the President (whoever he or she might be) doing something to limit the activities of the Congress. I had a discussion with a friend of mine from work about this, in which he noted that he found it strange that I would support anything that strengthens the executive branch when I typically argue that the executive branch has seized too much power.
On that point, he is right. I do feel that the checks and balances of our government act as a pendulum rather than a balanced system. I think the pendulum swings around, shifting the balance of power between the three branches of our government (executive, legislative, and judicial), but that it is rarely actually balanced.
Unfortunately, I think that the continuous growth of our population has potentially increased the size of Congress so much that it has weakened the legislative leg of the tripod permanently. How so? It seems like it must have been easier for two groups consisting of 26 and 65 members (for the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively) to come to a majority or even “veto-proof” agreement on action than it is for two groups consisting of 100 and 435 members to come to an agreement. Thus, the President (1 member) and the Supreme Court (9 members) have retained the exact same ability to come to a “majority” decision as ever, while the the Congress has steadily lost ability to come to a majority decision. With that loss of ability, it has become increasingly easy for the other two branches to outmaneuver the relative Goliath which is the legislative discussion group.
For examples of the executive branch’s power grabbing, I think you merely have to look at the way that legal enforcement has evolved. The no-warrant wiretaps and the decreasing bar for probable cause have increased the power of the executive branch. The idea of “executive privilege” also does so, although this is a fairly direct effort to avoid legislative oversight rather than a procedure related to actual executive work.
So why do I feel that the earmark and balanced budget ideas don’t fit that mold? Because both of them are 100% reversible and avoidable by a simple majority of Congress (as opposed to things like over-riding a veto). If the President sends back a sneaky earmark, that was slipped onto a bill with only the knowledge of a single Senator or Representative, and not knowingly voted upon by the body at large, then that earmark can easily be voted upon by Congress. If Congress wants to force the President to spend the correct amount of money, then they can make a budget that actually allots real money rather than demanding that he spend money which does not actually exist.
Indeed, it seems to me that, in these cases, the President would merely be preventing acts of fraud rather than over-riding the power of Congress. If a provision of a bill is slipped into a bill without the knowledge of the body of Congress or even the originating committee, then the person doing so is probably trying to defraud the system. If some person or entity perpetually continues to borrow money, without any intent to actually pay it back, then that individual or entity is likely trying to defraud the system.